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IN THE UTAH COURT Ot APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

No. 940624-CA

vs.

:

District Ct. No. 941900597

JOE RAKES,

:

Category 2

Defendant/Appellant.

COMES

NOW

(hereinafter

the

:

Appellant

to

the

above-captioned

matter

"Defendant"), by and through counsel, and hereby

submits the following as his reply brief herein:
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's brief contained inherent arguments that the trial
court committed plain error and that exceptional circumstances
exist in this matter. First, the trial court committed plain error
in failing to grant Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas
because the trial court did not engage in a specific discussion
regarding Defendant's personal understanding of the consequences,
and the trial court did not grant the withdrawal after Defendant
specifically
explained

informed the court of his own misconceptions and

facts

supporting

his

position.

Second,

this

case

contains exceptional circumstances in that trial counsel did not
file the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas until after the time
limit, trial counsel did not raise nor address the ineffective
assistance issue, trial counsel then filed the appeal in this
1

matter, and conflict counsel was not appointed until after the
appeal had been filed•
Defendant's

brief

also

established

that

prejudiced due to trial counsel's performance.

Defendant

was

Defendant asserted

trial counsel's actions or failure to act led him to plead guilty
when he would not have otherwise done so.

Additionally, trial

counsel's inherent conflict significantly prejudiced Defendant's
case.
Finally, Defendant has been required to rely on facts not
fully set forth in the record because important facts regarding
trial counsel's ineffective performance were not in the record due
to the unusual procedural nature of this case.

ARGUMENT
L.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF HIS
GUILTY PLEAS CONTAINED INHERENT ARGUMENTS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND THAT EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST IN THIS MATTER.
Although Defendant did not specifically assert that the trial
court committed plain error in refusing to allow Defendant to
withdraw his guilty pleas and further did not specifically assert
the existence of exceptional circumstances, Defendant's argument is
replete with arguments inherently asserting these positions.
standard has been set forth as follows:
"As a general rule, "a defendant who fails to bring an
issue before the trial court is barred from asserting it
initially on appeal." State v. Johnson, 774 P. 2d 1141,
1144 (Utah 1989).
However, an appellate court may
address an issue for the first time on appeal if: "(1)
2

The

the trial court committed 'plain error,' or (2)
are 'exceptional circumstances.'""

there

State v. Pricef 837 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d
Although

the

standard

was

920, 922

not

(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

specifically

mentioned

within

Defendant's brief, Defendant's arguments within the brief show that
the standard has been met in this case.
First, the trial court committed plain error in failing to
grant Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

As stated

in Defendant's brief, the trial court did not engage in a specific
discussion regarding

the Defendant's own understanding

consequences of entering the guilty pleas.
14).

of the

(Appellant's Brief, p.

The trial court merely asked Defendant whether he had entered

the pleas voluntarily.

The trial court did not ask Defendant to

explain his position nor to explain, in his own words, what he
believed to be the elements of or the factual basis for crimes that
he had committed and to which he was pleading guilty.
Brief, p. 13-14).

(Appellant's

Later, at the hearing on Defendant's motion to

withdraw the guilty pleas, Defendant informed the court that he was
under the impression that he was not bound to his guilty pleas if
he withdrew the same within thirty days.

(R. 142-145).

Defendant

further explained that he thought that by entering the pleas he
would have thirty days within which to speak to potential witnesses
about testifying at trial.

(R. 142).

Defendant also explained

that he thought that by entering the pleas he would have the time
and opportunity to obtain a specific drug test on the evidence
which may have shown that the substance in his possession was not
3

methamphetamine.

(R. 163).

In addition, at the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas,
Defendant also informed the court that the substance which as in
his possession

at the time he was arrested was not

methamphetamine.

actually

(R. 163). Defendant explained to the court that

the substance was a white powder that he had purchased legally at
a local gasoline station.

(R. 144). Defendant also informed the

court that he had spoken to a representative of the pharmacology
department at the University of Utah who had informed him of the
possibility of receiving a false positive test on a substance very
similar to methamphetamine.

(R. 144-145).

Defendant told the

court that the pharmacology department representative had explained
that the false positive test could occur on both police field tests
and state crime lab tests.

(R. 157). Defendant informed the court

that the pharmacology department representative had indicated a
willingness and readiness to perform a test which could prove
whether or not a false positive had resulted in this action.

(R.

148) .
As argued in Defendant7s brief, the facts set forth above show
that Defendant entered into the plea unknowingly, unintelligently,
and inadvisedly.

Further, at the hearing on Defendant's motion,

Defendant set forth sufficient
indicate

that

there

was

not

facts, as set forth above, to
a

factual

basis

for

the

plea.

Defendant's brief also explained the standard set forth by the
Utah Supreme Court with regard to the withdrawal of guilty pleas.
11

[A] presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in
4

general, be liberally granted.11
1042 (Utah 1987).

State v. Gallegos, 738 P. 2d 1040,

Even though the motion to withdraw the guilty

plea was filed a few days after the time limit, the motion was
filed

and

heard

prior

to

sentencing

and,

pursuant

to

the

discretion

and

circumstances of this case, should have been granted.
Accordingly,

the

trial

court

abused

its

committed plain error in refusing to grant Defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas in this matter.
Second, exceptional circumstances exist in this matter as
follows:

(1)

trial counsel did not file the motion to withdraw

the guilty pleas until after the thirty-day time limit, (2) trial
counsel did not raise nor address issues of ineffective assistance
or error at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas,
(3)

trial counsel

filed the appeal

in this matter, and

(4)

conflict counsel was not appointed until after the appeal had been
filed.

Trial counsel's errors during the time periods of both the

entry of the pleas and the motion for withdrawal are a significant
portion of the basis of this appeal.

Due to the fact that trial

counsel represented Defendant until a point after the appeal had
been filed, Defendant necessarily could not reasonably have raised
issues concerning trial counsel's errors and ineffectiveness until
this appeal.
In fact, this court has stated that "[w]hile ordinarily a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be addressed by
collateral attack through habeas corpus proceedings, in limited
circumstances, the claim may be raised on direct appeal . . . Those
5

circumstances exist when there is new counsel on appeal and there
is an adequate trial record."

State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484, 487

(Utah Ct. App. 1991) citing State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029
(Utah 1991); United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1072 (9th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Tatum. 943 F.2d 370, 380 (4th Cir.
1991); Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-34
(3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added) (holding that because there was new
counsel

on

appeal

circumstances

and

were

an adequate

exceptional

and

trial

record

therefore

the

existed, the
ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was considered as first raised on
appeal).
II. DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT HE HAS BEEN
PREJUDICED DUE TO TRIAL COUNSEL/S PERFORMANCE IN THIS
MATTER.
In it's brief, the State has asserted that Defendant has
relied on mere speculation to establish trial counsel's ineffective
assistance in this matter.

(State's brief, p. 11).

However,

Defendant asserted specific instances of trial counsel's action
and,

alternatively,

failure

ineffectiveness and resulted
Defendant's brief, pp. 18-19).

to

act

which

constituted

in prejudice to Defendant.

(See

The State further relies on State

v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), for the rule that
defendant must establish, on the record, both the identification of
specific

acts

or

omissions

that

fell

below

the

standard

of

reasonableness and that he would not have pleaded guilty but for
counsel's error.

However, the State's reliance on this case is

misplaced. Within Ellifritz, this Court merely stated that
6

lf

[w]hen

the question of trial counsel ineffectiveness is raised for the
first time on appeal and our review is confined to the trial court
record, we determine, as a matter of law, whether defense counsel's
performance constituted ineffective counsel." Id. at 175 (emphasis
added).
The State further claims that Defendant did not argue, "let
alone establish[], how any of trial counsel's acts or omissions led
him to plead guilty when he would not have otherwise."

(State's

brief, p. 11). However, Defendant's brief clearly indicated that
Defendant would not have plead guilty had trial counsel advised him
as to the nature and elements of the crime to which Defendant was
pleading guilty, or informed Defendant that the entry of a guilty
plea was a final disposition of the matter and would only be
withdrawn for good cause.

(Defendant's brief, p. 18). Defendant's

brief also indicated that Defendant would not have plead guilty had
trial counsel not led him to believe that he should plead guilty
because he would not be able to obtain witnesses to testify on his
behalf at trial.

(Defendant's brief, p. 18).

Furthermore, the State claims in its brief that the record
contains no facts to overcome the presumption that trial counsel
represented defendant competently, specifically asserting that the
record does not show that Defendant contested that he did not
intentionally attempt to possess the counterfeit methamphetamine.
However, as cited in Defendant's brief, Defendant specifically
informed the trial court that he did not intentionally attempt to
possess

a counterfeit

methamphetamine
7

and moreover, Defendant

specifically stated that the substance which he possessed was not
methamphetamine.

(R. 144, 163). Accordingly, the record contains

Defendant's specific assertion that he did not intentionally
attempt to possess methamphetamine because the substance in his
possession was a legally purchased product.
assert

that

Defendant

intentionally

It is nonsensical to

attempted

to

possess

methamphetamine when he specifically asserts his knowledge that the
substance was not methamphetamine.
The State also argues that trial counsel's failure to argue
the absence of a separately stated intent element at the hearing on
the motion to withdraw guilty pleas did not constitute deficiency
because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion.
This argument is circular, however, because it was trial counsel's
ineffectiveness (failure to act in filing the motion to withdraw
guilty pleas within the jurisdictional time limits) which caused
the court to find it lacked jurisdiction in the first place.
Finally, the State argues that Defendant did not set forth
independent authority for the assertion that trial counsel had a
conflict with Defendant at the hearing on the motion to withdraw
the guilty pleas due to a natural reluctance to admit prior
deficiencies and that therefore this Court need not reach the
merits of the claim.

Defendant had previously considered the

conflict engendered by trial counsel's position at the withdrawal
of plea hearing obvious and therefore did not set forth specific
authority relating similar circumstances.

However, authority

regarding ineffective assistance was presented in Defendant's
8

brief.
The circumstances in this matter are similar to those in State
v, Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Johnson was cited

in the State's brief as controlling case law.

In Johnson, this

Court stated as follows:
"[A] sixth amendment claim grounded on conflict of
interest is a special subtype of an ineffectiveness
claim" and must be analyzed under the following standard,
which is different than that used for other ineffective
assistance of counsel claims . . . A defendant who did
not object to the conflict at trial has the burden on
appeal of demonstrating with specificity that "an actual
conflict of interest existed which adversely affected his
[or her] lawyer's performance" . . . If the defendant
makes such a showing, prejudice need not be demonstrated
to prevail on the claim . . . The court will presume the
defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's performance.
JohnsonP at 488 (citations omitted).

Johnson was the first Utah

case in which the conflict of interest was between the lawyer and
the client, as is the circumstance in this case.

Johnson analyzed

the conflict of interest between lawyer and client in light of
ethical standards under the Rules of Professional Conduct, relying
on Government of Virgin Islands v. Zeppr 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.
1984) and United States v. Hobson. 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1982).
Rule 1.7(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states
that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by . . . the lawyer's own
interest,

unless:

(1)

The

lawyer

reasonably

representation will not be adversely affected; and
consents

after

consultation."

Also,

"in

believes

the

(2) Each client

order

to

continue

representation under Rule 1.7(b), the client's representation must
nQt

appear

to

be

adversely

affected
9

by

the

lawyer's

other

interests."

Johnson , at

489, citing

Code comparison, Utah

R.Prof.Conduct 1.7. Further, where the "probity of a lawyer's own
conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be
difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached
advice."

Comment, Utah R.Prof.Conduct 1.7.

In this matter, trial counsel's representation of Defendant
prior to and during the motion to withdraw the guilty plea
presented a conflict with her own interests. Trial counsel had a
responsibility to represent Defendant zealously, setting forth all
possible relevant arguments.

However, trial counsel also had a

conflicting self-interest of not setting forth arguments which
assert her own ineffectiveness. This conflict resulted in serious
prejudice to Defendant's case and resulted in denial of Defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

In Johnson, this Court held

that the attorney "had a personal interest in vindicating himself
which was not consonant with the interests of his client." Id. at
490.

The attorney in Johnson had been implicated as a co-

conspirator through witness testimony and closing argument at
trial.

This case is not similar to Johnson in the specific

circumstances of the conflict between counsel and client, but the
prejudicial result is the same.

Accordingly, trial counsel's

inherent conflict of interest at the hearing on plea withdrawal
resulted in prejudice to Defendant's case and therefore the trial
court's denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea should
be overturned.

10

Ill, DEFENDANT MUST. OF NECESSITY. RELY ON FACTS NOT
FULLY SET FORTH IN THE RECORD DUE TO THE EXCEPTIONAL
NATURE OF THIS CASE.
The State's brief is fraught with statements that Defendant
has

failed

to

rely

on

the

record

to

further

his arguments.

However, a great portion of Defendant's arguments are based on
errors made by Defendant's trial counsel.

These errors consist of

trial counsel's advice to Defendant and Defendant's requests to
trial counsel throughout the plea process.

These errors also

consist of trial counsel's failure to file the motion to withdraw
guilty pleas within the thirty-day time period.

Conversations

between counsel and client are certainly not normally part of the
record on appeal.
Significantly, trial counsel filed the appeal in this matter.
At that time, the record was prepared and transmitted to the Court
of Appeals.

It was not until after this time that trial counsel

withdrew as a result of the inherent conflict in this case.

This

inherent conflict was due to the fact that trial counsel cannot
reasonably

argue

his

or

her

own

Conflict counsel was appointed.

ineffectiveness

on

appeal.

However, since the appeal had

already been filed without a previous opportunity to assert trial
counsel's ineffectiveness, Defendant's only alternative consisted
of filing a motion for remand pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Defendant has done so, and has

renewed his motion after the initial denial.
twice.

It has been denied

Had the motion been granted, Defendant would have had an
11

opportunity to supplement the record with specific testimony
concerning

trial

counsel's

ineffectiveness.

nevertheless denied Defendant's motion for remand.

This

Court

Accordingly,

Defendant cannot cite to any record with regard to specific
allegations

of misconduct

by

trial

counsel, other than his

affidavit before this Court in support of his Rule 23B motion.
Defendant should not be denied the opportunity to make such
important arguments. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide
exceptions to the reguirement of citation to the record in other
circumstances.

For example, parties may prepare and sign a

statement of the case, approved by the trial court, in lieu of
citing to the record on appeal. Utah R. App. P. 11 (e). Further,
appellants may prepare a statement of evidence or proceedings when
no report was made or when the transcript is unavailable. Utah R.
App. P. 11 (f). Finally, corrections and/or modifications to the
record may be made upon motion of either party or by the trial
court, sua sponte. Utah R. App. P. 11 (h).
Although the specific exceptions enumerated in the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure are not expressly applicable in this case,
this court should carry out the intent of such exceptions in
providing the ability to set forth facts not contained in the
record of the trial court under limited circumstances.
such an exceptional, limited circumstance.
consider Defendant's affidavit.

12

This is

The court should

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial
court.

The Court should set aside Defendant's guilty pleas and

should remand this matter for trial on the merits.

Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1996.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.

MARY C. CORPORON iS>£r "???[
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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